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Abstract
The recent crisis has shed light on the weaknesses and the drawbacks of the European
Monetary Union. In particular, many economists and commentators have suggested the
need to complement the existing common monetary policy and stability pacts with some
kind of fiscal union, i.e., enhanced supranational fiscal space and coordination, as a way to
limit the impacts of idiosyncratic shocks and provide more risk sharing.
The economic literature has proposed many solutions along this line, such as the institution
of a European Minister of Finance, a central fiscal authority, Eurobonds, or a coordinated
scheme of unemployment insurance. More specifically, the notion of fiscal union may imply
the development of European revenue sources for the EMU budget, the harmonization of
taxation within the EMU, a mechanism to increase fiscal discipline at both the union and
national levels, building up a union-wide insurance mechanism against financial turbulence,
including debt mutualization.
Examples of these proposals are Ubide (2015) and Corsetti et al. (2015) which propose
Stability Bonds that would give proceeds to member states and could be used to enact
counter-cyclical fiscal policies in the Euro Area. Sapir and Wolff (2015) recommend the
creation of a Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy (EFP) with two goals: fiscal debt sustainability
and an adequate area-wide fiscal position. Guiso and Morelli (2014) propose the creation of
a European Federal Institute to which member states would transfer part of their budget,
equal to some agreed-upon share of the value of the EFI’s accumulated debt. Further, Clayes
et al. (2014) claim that the EMU should adopt a common system of partially centralized
unemployment benefits, coming from the need for counter-cyclical horizontal transfers, which
should act as mutual insurance. Moreover, the European Commission (2012) advances
the idea of building a centralized Eurozone fund which would provide member states with
automatic but temporary fiscal transfers in the case of adverse idiosyncratic shocks (repaid
in good times). Many of these proposals are on the table with the goal of reinforcing the
overall EU governance.
In this work we address two fundamental issues concerning the general Euro Zone architecture
and its prospect. One relates to the implementation of a common EMU fiscal policy,
its ability to stimulate growth during periods of downturns and to smooth out the
effects of adverse shocks, reacting to them at business cycle frequency (aggregate demand
management and fiscal multipliers). The other regards shock absorption across state borders
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and the strengthening of financial markets’ integration (private risk-sharing) and national
governments’ intervention into credit markets or supranational institutions arrangements
(public risk-sharing).
What comes to light is that a unique European fiscal policy may not be as beneficial as it is
often claimed, because the fiscal transmission mechanisms are quite different across member
states. Indeed, in the first paper of this thesis we show that fiscal multipliers are different
across EMU countries (the analysis concerns Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain).
The study detects instability in the magnitude of the multipliers and in the slopes of the
impulse response functions, both across countries and times, using standard VARs and time
varying parameter VARs (TVP-VAR). We claim that the differences are due to transmission
mechanisms (in the paper they are captured by the beta coefficients of the TVP-VAR) and
driving forces rather than the magnitude and the volatility of national fiscal shocks per se (in
the paper they are captured by the standard deviations of the TVP-VAR residuals). We argue
that the observed degree of heterogeneity in the fiscal multipliers and in the other response
coefficients across EMU countries casts some doubt on the real ability of EMU governments
to coordinate their fiscal actions when needed and on the effectiveness of a common EMU
fiscal policy in stimulating real economic activity.
In the second paper of this dissertation, instead, we study the mechanisms, extent and
characteristics of risk sharing across the EMU. How well do international financial markets
allow for consumption smoothing in member countries facing idiosyncratic shocks? How
effective are public national and supranational institutions in improving risk sharing? Our
analysis extends the work and methodology pioneered by Asdrubali et al (1996) by updating
results up to 2014 and by identifying the role of the European institutions (like the European
Financial Stability Facility (ESFS) or the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM)) created
right after the great recession with the objective of assisting countries with limited market
access. As a matter of fact, we find that the role played by public official transfers from these
institutions to more vulnerable countries in order to smooth consumption during the great
depression is noteworthy: the ESFS and the ESM have increased the amount of risk sharing
within the EMU.
More specifically, we use the method of variance decomposition first implemented by
Asdrubali et al (1996) to identify the main channels of risk sharing (net factor income,
international transfers and credit markets) and we split the credit market channel into two
parts: smoothing achieved through private institutions (markets) and the public sector
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(national governments and official European institutions). We find that the European
institutions have largely compensated the reduced role of national governments during the
recent financial crisis.
Based on these contributions, we derive some fiscal policy suggestions and conclusions. First,
we think that there are reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness and feasibility of a
common fiscal policy for the purpose of stabilizing the business cycle. The reasons are that
the fiscal transmission mechanisms are different among countries; countries need their own
fiscal counter-cyclical measures in order to absorb idiosyncratic shocks, and, last but not
least, European countries are not ready and willing to give up their sovereignty. Secondly,
we suggest another type of coordination for EMU fiscal governance that is based on sharing
resources at central level, through well-functioning and participated European institutions
(along the lines of the ESM), that provide transfers to countries in exceptional circumstances
and during period of downturns.
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